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To prepare for the 2008 Olympic Games, China adopted a number of radical measures to improve
air quality. Using officially reported air pollution index (API) from 2000 to 2009, we show that these
measures improved the API of Beijing during and after the Games, but 60% of the effect faded away
by the end of October 2009. Since the credibility of API data has been questioned, an objective and
indirect measure of air quality at a high spatial resolution – aerosol optimal depth (AOD), derived
using the data from the NASA satellites – was analyzed and compared with the API trend. The analysis
confirms that the improvement was real but temporary and most improvement was attributable to plant
closure and traffic control. Our results suggest that it is possible to achieve real environmental improvement
in an authoritarian regime but the magnitude of the effect and how long it lasts depend on the political
motivation behind the policy interventions.
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Air pollution is a great challenge for human health. What policy interventions are 
effective in improving air quality? How long will their effects last? The radical air-cleaning 
actions that China took before the 2008 Olympic Games provide a unique opportunity to answer 
these questions.   
Before the Games, China was often cited for elevated air pollution levels. This risked 
China‟s stake to host the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and put China‟s air pollution under the 
world‟s spotlight.
 Since the primary motive of hosting the Games was to establish a positive 
image of China, improving air quality became one of the most visible tasks for the Chinese 
government. Under an authoritarian regime
1, China was able to take a series of radical actions 
quickly at a large scale. These actions, including plant closure/relocation, furnace replacement, 
introduction of new emission standard, and stringent traffic control, cost over US$10 billion.
2 
Plus the $42.9 billion
3 spent on city infrastructure and Olympic stadiums,
4 Beijing Olympics 
were arguably the largest natural experiment in air cleaning and the most expensive Games in the 
Olympic history.  
Although poor air quality in Beijing drew public attention worldwide before and during 
the Olympics, China did not allow individual researchers to access in situ measurements of air 
pollution. Given the data constraints, we rely on the official daily air pollution index (API) 
published by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China (MEP), as well as the aerosol 
optical depth (AOD) derived using the data from the Moderate Resolution Imaging 
Spectraradiomenter (MODIS) aboard NASA's Terra and Aqua satellites (which cross China daily 
at 10:30am and 1:30pm local time, respectively).  API is a composite index of Sulphur Dioxide 
(SO2), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), and total suspended particles (TSP); and AOD represents the 
                                                 
1 China is classified as an authoritarian regime according to the Economist Intelligence Unit‟s Democracy Index 
(2008), accessed at www.economist.com/node/12499352?story_id=o12499352. 
2 Both UNEP (2009) and Zhang (2008) report that the planned environmental investment is $5.6 billion between 1998 
and 2002, and $6.6 billion between 2003 and 2007. According to Zhang (2008), the actual environmental investment made 
between 1998 and 2007 is $15.7 billion.  
3
 According to the city government of Beijing, the total city infrastructure investment made between 2001 and 2008 is roughly 
280 billion RMB (or US$41 billion) and the total investment in Olympic stadiums is 13 billion RMB (or US$1.9 billion), see 
more details at http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/7609928.html.  
4 An official audit from the State Council of China concludes that the Olympics made a modest profit of US$145 
million with total expenditure of US$2.8093 billion and total income of $2.975 billion. However, this report does 
not include many expenditures spent by the local government in the name of the Olympic Games 
(http://www.runblogrun.com/2009/06/beijing_olympics_made_103_mill.html). Media has estimated the total 
expenditure to be $43 billion (http://www.sourcejuice.com/1183548/2009/06/19/China-announced-results-audit-
confirmed-clean-Olympics/). 3 
 
concentration of airborne solid and liquid particulates that can absorb, reflect and scatter the 
electromagnetic radiation. The credibility of API has been questioned (Andrews 2008), but AOD 
is an objective measure retrieved from satellite data and immune from any gaming incentives 
facing Chinese officials.  
Our main methodology is comparing Beijing with 28 non-Olympic cities before, during 
and after the Games while controlling for a long list of differential factors.  We also separately 
control for five cities that co-hosted the Games in other parts of China (referred to as co-host 
cities) and three cities surrounding Beijing that adopted measures to improve air quality in and 
around Beijing (referred to as neighbor cities). Time-wise, we take the one and half years before 
the setup of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) 
as the benchmark period (6/5/2000-12/12/2001) and detect treatment effects in three windows: 
the seven-year preparation period (12/13/2001-8/7/2008), the one month during the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games (8/8/2008-9/17/2008), and 13 months after the Games (9/18/2008-
10/31/2009).  
After controlling for various factors, we find that the average API of Beijing dropped 
from 109.01 in 2000 and 2001 to 76.69 during the Games. Most of the improvement did not 
occur until the Games started. After the Games ended, we estimate that the API of Beijing 
reverts to 82.52 in one month and to 96.29 ten-to-thirteen months after the Games. In 
comparison, the AOD of Beijing (which shows a positive relationship with air pollution) started 
to decline before the Games, continued to decline during the Games, and reached the lowest 
level 2-6 months after the Games. In contrast to surface measures of API, aerosol can be 
circulated in the air for a longer life span, so the delay in AOD improvement is not surprising. 
Consistent with the API findings, the improvement in AOD started to revert since Spring 2009. 
This suggests that air quality improvement in Beijing was real but temporary.  Further analysis of 
API and visibility (another official statistics related to air pollution but with less media attention) 
finds little evidence of gaming in API.  
The unique setting of Beijing Olympics allows us to compare different air cleaning 
actions. Accounting for the different timing of actions, we find that the API improvement, 
especially the improvement in TSP, is most attributable to plant closure and traffic control. More 
importantly, the fine resolution of AOD enables us to link the center of each AOD observation to 
road density and plant closure within a five-kilometer radius. As expected, we find more AOD 4 
 
improvements in the areas with greater road density and more plant closures but all of the 
differential effects decline gradually over time. These findings are consistent with the fact that 
most plant closures and traffic controls were only effective in the periods immediately before or 
during the Games.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2-4 summarize the background, the 
related literature and the data respectively. Section 5 presents the main results on API and AOD. 
Section 6 addresses the concern of data gaming from Chinese officials. Section 7 examines the 
mechanisms that can potentially contribute to the air quality improvement of Beijing. Section 8 
summarizes the main findings of this paper. 
 
2. Background 
China has been known for poor air quality. The 1996 national standard on Sulphur 
Dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), total suspended particles (TSP), and particulate matter 
with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 microns or smaller (PM10) were 2-7 times higher than the 
standards established by the World Health Organization (UNEP 2009). An amendment in 2000 
further weakened the Chinese standard for NO2 and Ozone. Even so, the relatively generous 
standard is hard to enforce in China. Sixteen Chinese cities appeared on the list of the world‟s 
top twenty most polluted places in 2007.
5 Some athletes were so concerned about the air quality 
that they planned to either wear masks in competition or skip the Beijing Olympic Games (Los 
Angeles Times March 12, 2008; New York Times March 12, 2008). 
China adopted a number of air cleaning policies for the Olympic Games. After the 
International Olympic Committee awarded Beijing the 2008 Games on July 13, 2001, China 
established the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) 
on December 13, 2001. The main responsibility of BOCOG was preparing for the 2008 Games, 
this included infrastructure development, environment improvement, public relation, and 
logistics. The three main concepts promoted by BOCOG were “Green Olympics, High-tech 
Olympics and People's Olympics”, highlighting the importance of environmental protection and 
public interests.  
We assume that December 13, 2001 was the earliest date when the Chinese government 




started to implement air quality improvement policies for the Olympic Games. To the extent that 
the Olympic-related air cleaning efforts started before the setup of the BOCOG, our results 
represent a conservative estimate of the overall effect. The main treatment period ranged from 
the start of the 2008 Olympic Games (8/8/2008) to the end of the Paralympic Games 
(9/17/2008). The seven year window from the setup of BOCOG to the start of the Games is 
referred to as “Games Preparation” and the 13 months after the Games (9/18/2008 to 
10/31/2009) is referred to “Post Games.” All these are compared to the “benchmark” period from 
the start of our data (6/5/2000 for API and 2/26/2000 for AOD) to the setup of BOCOG 
(12/12/2001).  
To prepare for the Games, China took most air cleaning actions in Beijing. December 31 
of 2002 marked the end of Beijing‟s Phase 8 environmental cleaning efforts (phase 1 started 
from 1998), which included conversion of 1500 coal furnaces into clean fuel, retirement of  
23,000 old automobiles, reduction in emission from the  major industrial plants by 30 thousand 
tons, and an increase of 100 km
2 area under green coverage.  
In 2003 and 2004, Beijing reduced the industrial use of coal by 10 million tons, 
desulfurated the air pollutants from the YanShan Petrochemical Company, shut down coal-fired 
generators in the Capital Steel Company and Beijing Coking Plant, and closed Beijing Dyeing 
Plant. Between 2005 and 2006, China constructed desulfuration, dust removal and denitrification 
facilities in Beijing Thermal Power Plant and Power Plant of the Capital Steel. By the end of 
October 2006, Beijing renovated 100% of the furnaces for clean fuel in five districts, and 50% in 
the three other districts. The largest plant relocation – for the Capital Steel Company – started 
from 2005 and the biggest action took place toward the end of 2007, the same time as the closure 
of the Second Beijing Chemical Plant and Beijing Eastern Petrochemical Co. Ltd. Based on these 
institutions, we define October 31, 2006 as the benchmark point for furnace renovation and 
December 31, 2007 as the benchmark for plant closure.  
Beijing also attempted to control for vehicle emission by adopting new emission 
standards on March 1, 2008 (applicable to new vehicles only) and restricting on-road vehicles to 
half based on even or odd vehicle registration number  during 8/17/2007-8/20/2007 and 
7/20/2008-9/20/2008. A weaker form of traffic control continued after the Games as each 
registered vehicle was required to be off the road one weekday per week.  
According to Streets (2007) neighboring provinces and municipalities such as Hebei, 6 
 
Shandong and Tianjin made a significant contribution to air pollution in Beijing. Therefore, co-
host and neighbor cities adopted the similar measures to improve air quality, but the magnitudes 
were smaller than those for Beijing. For example, Tianjin implemented the same odd-even traffic 
control but only during the Olympic Games, Shandong requested closure of 132 heavy polluting 
plants during the Games, Shenyang invested 163 million RMB to replace old buses, and 
Shanghai installed desulfuration facilities for large electricity generating plants. Given the 
limited access to time and location specific policies, we report the general API/AOD change for 
Beijing, co-host and neighbor cities, but restrict the detailed mechanism analysis to Beijing.    
While the 2008 Olympic Games triggered many new efforts for cleaning air, some 
environmental protection policies existed even before 2000. For example, the central government 
started to build the green great wall in northern China since 1978. A nationwide policy was 
adopted in 1999 to encourage farmers to convert less productive farm into green land. These 
policies targeted desertification instead of air pollution, but the two are clearly linked. A more 
direct nationwide campaign for “blue sky” started in 1997. Defining “blue sky” if API below 
100, the central government included the frequency of blue sky days as a performance measure 
reported by local officials. The 2002 amendment specified that a “model city” must have at least 
80% of days with “blue sky” in a calendar year. This standard was raised to 85% in 2008.
6 To 
the extent that performance evaluation has a significant impact on local government policies, air 
quality improvements may have occurred nationwide long before the 2008 Games. In our 
analysis, we control for all the national air-cleaning policies by date fixed effects.  
Some earlier air-cleaning efforts were Beijing specific. Before the setup of the BOCOG, 
the city government of Beijing already carried out seven phases of air cleaning. Probably due to 
the increasing occurrence of sand storms, Beijing realized that its early efforts were fruitless and 
it was necessary to adopt more stringent measures to improve air quality. This led to the start of 
phase 1 cleaning on December 16, 1998.
7  As time went by, the 50
th National Day (10/1/1999) 
helped to further justify air cleaning, but the efforts of Beijing continued after the celebration. 
During the seven phases of air cleaning before the setup of BOCOG, Beijing adopted many 
measures, including extended use of clean fuel, introducing desulfuration of equipment, covering 
                                                 
6 For more details, see MEP documents #1997-349 (stipulated in May 1997), #2002-132 (stipulated on November 
19, 2002) and #2008-71 (stipulated on September 21, 2008, effective January 1, 2010).  
7 See Beijing municipal documents 1998 #24 (phase 1), 1999 #249 (phase 2), and 1999 #29 (phase 3) for more 
details.  7 
 
bare land with grass and trees, enforcing the retirement of heavy-duty vehicles,  dust control on 
construction sites, and a ban on outdoor barbeques. To the extent that Beijing had specific 
reasons to adopt these policies, it was important to control for the city fixed effects and city-
specific trend.  
 
3. Literature Review  
Although researchers have attempted to investigate air quality change in response to the 
Olympic related interventions (Wang et al. 2009a; Tang et al. 2009; Yao et al. 2009; Simorich 
2009), the lack of access to in situ measurements of air pollution data has constrained 
researchers‟ ability to fully evaluate the effects of these interventions.  
Two studies have used their own measurements of air quality instead of the published 
API. Wang et al. (2009a) collected PM10 and PM2.5 data in Peking University between July 28 
and October 7, 2008. They found a significant correlation between the self-measured and 
published PM10, but the absolute level of their self-measure is 30% higher. This finding triggered 
some concerns that the official API must have been subject to manipulation, but this discrepancy 
can be attributed to sampling (through systematic bias in the locations of samplers and types of 
samplers used) and methodological differences (Tang et al, 2009, Yao et al. 2009, Simorich 
2009).  Wang et al. (2009a) also find that meteorological conditions such as wind, precipitation 
and humidity account for 40% of the total variation in PM10. This finding motivates us to control 
for meteorological conditions that can greatly influence concentration and transportation of air 
pollutants (Kumar et al. 2011).  
Wang et al. (2009b) compare the self-measured ambient concentrations of Black Carbon 
(BC) in Beijing in the summers of 2007 and 2008. Although their data covered a longer time 
span than that of Wang et al. (2009a), they do not control for the nationwide trend of air quality 
between 2007 and 2008. The main finding of Wang et al. (2009b) is that the BC concentration 
was significantly better during the traffic controls than without the traffic controls. We could not 
find a precise definition of BC particles in Wang et al. (2009b), but we also suspect BC particles 
are much correlated to diesel exhaust (either from heavy duty vehicles or  industries).  
Unlike academic researchers, United Nations published a summary report (UNEP 2009) 
based on in situ measures of CO, PM10, SO2 and NO2 from the Beijing Environmental Protection 
Bureau (EPB). Their data ranged from 2000 to 2008 including a couple of months immediately 8 
 
after the Olympic Games.  The report examines Beijing‟s in situ measurements before, during 
and immediately after the Games while controlling for meteorological factors. As shown in 
Figure 4, the officially reported API data shows a nationwide trend toward better air. This 
implies that a simple before-after comparison within Beijing is likely to confound the nationwide 
trend with the actual air quality improvement due to the policy interventions adopted for the 
Games. We overcome this shortcoming by comparing Beijing with other big Chinese cities in the 
same time horizon.  We also employ API data until 13 months after the Games so as to better 
evaluate the fade-away effect after the Games. Like this paper, UNEP (2009) has used several 
satellite images from NASA‟s Terra and Aqua satellites for August 2008, but our resolution of 
AOD (10 km x 10 km) is much smaller than theirs (100km x 100km) and our frequency is daily 
instead of monthly. These rich details allow us to link AOD to the exact date and geographic 
location of plant closure and traffic control, a process essential to attribute air quality 
improvement to specific policy interventions.   
  Andrews (2008) suspected that Beijing may have manipulated the official API data for 
several reasons:  Beijing relocated monitoring stations over time; the 2000 MEP standard for air 
quality weakened the limits of Nitrogen Oxides and Ozone; the number of days with API 
between 96 and 100 was significantly higher than the number of days with API between 101 and 
105. Guinot (2008) suggests that it is not uncommon to add monitoring stations with economic 
and urban development and the uncertainty in the API metrics may range from 15% to 25% due 
to measurement errors. In addition to using high resolution AOD data as an objective measure of 
air quality, another novel aspect of our research is to investigate the gaming of API using API 
and visibility, another official statistics related to air pollution but with less media attention. 
A growing body of literature has attempted to evaluate the effect policy interventions on 
air quality in other developing countries.  Davis (2008) examines the traffic restrictions in 
Mexico City (forcing vehicles off the road one day per week) and finds no effect on air quality. 
He attributes the finding to more vehicles in circulation and a composition change toward high-
emission vehicles. In a similar study, Kathuria (2002) finds that the emission controls that Delhi 
adopted in 1999 to 2001 had little impact on air quality improvement for two potential reasons. 
First, more vehicles were added on the road after policy went into effect. Second, no 
supplemental policies were in place to check the traffic volume despite the fact that new vehicles 
had better emission standards. Kumar et al. (2009) examined air pollution 9 
 
distribution/redistribution in Delhi in response to a series of air quality regulations. Two 
alarming findings emerged from this study. First, the air quality of the City improved after the 
regulations, but the effects of the regulations faded away several years after the regulations. 
Second, while the regulations improved air quality in the city, the air quality of neighboring 
areas, without the regulations in place, deteriorated. Another study by Foster and Kumar (2011) 
suggests that the improvement in air quality of the City improved respiratory health of Delhi 
residents and the deteriorated air quality in the neighboring areas is likely to have adverse health 
effects. Foster, Gutierrez and Kumar (2009) examine Mexican plants‟ voluntary participation in 
a major pollution reduction program. They find evidence that measures of voluntary participation 
are related to lower AOD and less infant mortality due to respiratory causes. 
Our research is also related to a broader literature on environmental policies. Several 
studies in the US have documented the health effects of air pollution (Chay and Greenstone 
2002, Almond et al. 2009, Currie and Neidell 2005), the effect of environmental policies on 
polluting industries (Henderson 1996, Becker and Henderson 2000, List et al. 2003), and the 
social costs of environmental policies (Hazilla and Kopp 1990). Most of these studies suggest 
that air quality improvement is a long time process and largely depends on the dynamic interplay 
of government policies and private compliance. In contrast, the actions that China undertook for 
the Beijing Olympics were largely government-driven, much more intensive, and implemented 
in a relatively short period. Not only do these features help separate the effects of the Chinese 
efforts from other confounding factors in the long run, they also help understand how much air 
quality improvement can be achieved if an authoritarian government is willing and able to 
implement intensive measures in a short time.  
More specifically, this study is likely to augment our understanding of the political 
economy of environmental protection in a socialist country. It has been argued that authoritarian 
regimes are more reluctant to protect the environment as they enjoy a greater-than-median 
income share and have a shorter-than-average time horizon than a democratic regime. Congleton 
(1992) and Murdoch and Sandler (1997) show that the democratic countries are more likely to 
support and enforce chlorofluorocarbon emissions control under the Montreal Protocol. 
However, one factor less noticed in the literature is the greater administrative power of 
authoritarians. If political opportunities motivate authoritarians to protect the environment, an 
authoritarian regime like China,
 may overcome industrial resistance and implement 10 
 
environmental protection policies quicker and at a large scale. These politically motivated 
interventions set the stage for a social experiment to understand how policy interventions in an 
authoritarian regime can improve air quality and protect the environment in a relatively short 
time frame.  
 
4. Data 
  The data for this research were acquired from several sources: the official API data 
published by the MEP, visibility and other meteorological data from the China Meteorological 
Administration (CMA) and the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC 2007), and  the AOD data 
from NASA. Data from China, reported by city and day, were available from June 5, 2000 to 
October 31, 2009; AOD was extracted at 10km spatial resolution for every day within 100km 
distance to the city center for each city from February 26, 2000 to December 31, 2009.   
API Data: For each focal city, the MEP aggregates the measured intensities of NO2, SO2 
and TSP into a daily air pollution index (API) ranging from 0 to 500.
8 Specifically, suppose a 
city has M stations and each station monitors NO2, SO2 and TSP for N times each day,
9 MEP 
first computes the daily average of all the MxN measures for each pollutant and then translate the 
daily mean intensity into pollutant-specific API according to linear spines with the cutoff points 
defined in Table 1.
10 The overall API is the maximum of all the pollutant-specific APIs. If that 
maximum is above 500, the overall API is capped at 500. An API below 50 is defined as 
“excellent” air quality, 50-100 as “good”, 100-200 as “slightly polluted”, 200-300 as 
“moderately polluted” and above 300 as “heavily pollution.” A crude categorization refers to a 
day with API at or below 100 as “blue sky.”  
  MEP reports API data by city and day, and the category of the dominant pollutant(s) if 
API is above 50.  By this definition, we can infer the absolute level of TSP for 72.9% of data 
points across all cities. For the other 19.9% of the data where API was less than 50, we knew 
TSP was upward bounded by the TSP level corresponding to the reported API. In comparison, 
                                                 
8 MEP monitors the intensity of CO, but does not include it in the current API calculation because the calculation 
formula was set ten years ago and at that time the vehicle volume in China was very low. MEP is considering adding 
CO and other pollutants for future API. Source: http://news.163.com/09/0312/11/5470SBA9000120GU.html 
9 The MEP stipulates the number of monitoring stations according to city population and the size of the established 
area. For a large city like Beijing, one monitoring station is required for every 25-30 km
2 and the total number of 
stations must be at least 8.    
10For example, if the daily mean of TSP is 370 μg/m
3, the corresponding API of TSP is (370-300)/(500-300)*(200-
100)+100 = 135.   11 
 
inference on NO2 and SO2 was much more difficult because only 0.35% of city-days reported 
NO2 and 6.85% reported SO2 as the dominant pollutant. 
Meteorological data from CMA are reported at 2pm each day at a fixed point in each 
city. It allows us to control for local temperature, precipitation, barometric pressure, sunshine, 
humidity and wind. The data also include visibility, the greatest distance at which an observer 
with normal eyesight can discern a dark object from the horizontal sky. Researchers have shown 
that API and visibility are negatively correlated (Che et al. 2006, Fan and Li 2008) and visibility 
is considered to be an important predictor of fine particulates (Ozkaynak et al. 1985, Huang et al. 
2009).
 11 Like API, visibility is reported by Chinese officials but attracts less media attention than 
API. For this reason, Section 6 will use visibility to check the reliability and gaming of API. 
Should there be gaming of API , it should show greater improvement before, during and after the 
Games than the improvement in visibility. 
Conditional on having non-break API and visibility data, our analysis consists of 37 
cities.
12 We grouped these cities into four categories: Beijing was a category by itself because 
most of the Games were held in Beijing; Qingdao, Shenyang, Tianjin, Shanghai, and 
Qinghuangdao were categorized as the “co-host” cities because they hosted some of the Games 
in the treatment period.
13 BOCOG defined six cities close to Beijing as “Olympic Environment 
Protection Cities.” Our sample included the three largest neighboring cities: Taiyuan, 
Shijiazhuang, Huhehaote.
14 The other 28 cities were grouped in the category of control cities. As 
shown in Figure 1, the sample covered almost every provincial capital in China and most 
treatment cities (Beijing, co-host and neighboring cities) are located in the developed parts of 
east China.  
AOD Data: The daily 10km AOD data (Level 2, collection 5.0) were acquired from 
NASA (NASA 2010).  AOD is retrieved using the data from Moderate Resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) aboard Terra and Aqua satellites. The AOD extraction procedure is 
                                                 
11 Fine particulates (PM2.5), are defined as particulates with less than 2.5µm in aerodynamic diameter. 
12 Although the MEP reports API for 86 cities and the CMA visibility data cover 69 cities, only 42 cities has API 
data in 2000 and the visibility data are incomplete for some cities between 1993 and 2009. For an unknown reason, 
the API data are missing on June 4, 2008 for all cities. So the “non-break” criterion ignores the missing data on June 
4, 2008. 
13 Qinhuangdao is the only city that violates our sampling rule because its API data is not available until 2001. We 
include it in the sample in order to cover all co-host cities. Results are robust if we exclude Qinhuangdao from the 
sample. 
14 The other three “Olympic Environment Protection Cities” are Datong, Yangquan and Chifeng. None of them is 
provincial capital.  12 
 
available elsewhere (Chu, Kaufman et al. 2003; Levy, Remer et al. 2007; Levy, Remer et al. 
2007).  In recent years, many researchers have shown that AOD, corrected for meteorological 
conditions, can predict air quality (Gupta, Christopher et al. 2006; Kumar, Chu et al. 2011). 
Focusing on Delhi and Kanpur in India and Cleveland in US, Kumar et al. (2009; 2011) 
demonstrate how AOD can be converted to PM10 estimates. They develop an empirical 
relationship between in situ measurements of PM10 and AOD. They conclude that the AOD 
captured 70% of the variations in the PM10 (monitored on the surface) after controlling for 
meteorological conditions and seasonality. Since the in situ PM10 data were not available in 
China, this paper utilizes AOD corrected for meteorological conditions and spatiotemporal 
structure.   
  In addition to being immune to potential data manipulation from Chinese officials, AOD 
can be extracted at a high spatial resolution (~10km x 10km). This enabled us to evaluate change 
in AOD with respect to the location specific interventions of plant closure and traffic control. 
Despite these advantages, there are several concerns about the AOD data. First, without the in 
situ measurements of air pollution it is difficult to develop and validate robust air quality 
estimates. This implies that the air quality improvement detected from AOD is relative instead of 
absolute. Second, by definition, AOD captures the amount of radiation absorbed, reflected and 
scattered due to the presence of solid and liquid particulates suspended in the atmosphere 
(Kaufman, Gobron et al. 2002; Kaufman, Tanre et al. 2002). Since the sources of aerosol can be 
natural (such as dust storm, sea salt forest fire) and anthropogenic (combustion), air quality 
(PM10 concentration) predicted using AOD can vary regionally. We cannot extrapolate the PM10 
predictive model of Delhi or Cleveland to China. Third, AOD is sensitive to the point and time 
specific weather conditions, and it is not possible to retrieve AOD under cloudy conditions; 
therefore there are systematic gaps (across time and geographic space) in AOD dataset (Kumar 
2010).  
  In total, we retrieved 102,820 valid 10km AOD observations over Beijing from February 
25, 2000 to December 31, 2009. Of all the 3,596 calendar days in the time span of this study, 
only 2,297 days (64%) had valid AOD observations due to gaps in the data. On average, we had 
45 data points of AOD per day over Beijing. Similarly, the AOD data were retrieved for the 
other 36 cities, which brought the total sample of AOD to 2,614,734 data points. 
   To control for time-specific meteorological conditions at the observation time of AOD, 13 
 
we acquired hourly global surface meteorological data from the monitoring stations in and 
around the selected cities. The details on these data are available elsewhere (NCDC 2007). These 
data were collocated with the AOD data within one hour time interval of AOD time on a given 
day. This means we assigned the same value of meteorological conditions (from the closest 
station) to all AOD values in a given city on a same day. Since there were subtle gaps in the 
meteorological and AOD data, it resulted in missing values in 6% of the sample. Therefore, 
meteorological conditions were imputed for missing days when AOD was available. The 
procedure impute was employed to estimate missing values with the aid of continuous time and 
other city specific meteorological conditions in STATA  (StataCorp 2010). 
Information about location-specific actions was collected for Beijing only. We 
overlay a 2.5km x 2.5km grid over Beijing, and define three variables for each cell of the 
grid. The first is a dummy variable that indicates whether the cell has any permanent plant 
closure at present or before the study date d (close_pergd). This was defined using the exact 
addresses  and  closure  dates  of  four  large  plants.  The  second  variable  is  also  a  dummy 
variable  and  includes  information  on  whether  the  cell  has  any  temporary  plant  closure 
during the study date (close_temgd). This included 20 temporary closures reported in the 
local newspapers; the plant closure dates were defined as from 7/20/2008 to 9/20/2008. The 
exact locations of permanently or temporarily closed plants are shown in Figure 2. The third 
variable is the length of major and secondary roads in cell g during 2005 (road_deng). This 
variable is time-invariant and will be interacted with the period dummies to capture policy 
interventions due to the Games. Figure 3 shows the cell-by-cell distribution of major and 
secondary roads in Beijing.   
To merge these location-specific interventions with AOD, we take the center of each 
AOD observation (by latitude and longitude) and draw a 5km radius around it. We then sum 
and average the values of all three variables (close_pergd, close_temgd  and road_deng) in all 
2.5km cells that overlap with the search radius.  
Supplemental Data: In addition to the API, meteorological and satellite data, we 
acquired data on economic development indicators, including GDP growth rate, GDP per 
capita,  total  industrial  production,  and  population  density  by  city  and  year  from  the 
statistical  yearly  book  published  by  the  National  Statistical  Bureau.  These  data  were 
available  up  to  2008.  In  the  main  analysis,  dummy  variables  were  created  to  indicate 14 
 
missing socioeconomic variables in 2009.  
To the extent that Beijing‟s unobservable economic growth may follow a different 
linear trend over time, it is controlled for in the city-specific trend. To further address the 
concern that Beijing may experience different economic growth in 2009, we use 2007 and 
2008 economic development data to extrapolate the 2009 data for each city separately. In 
2008, many economic activities of Beijing were Olympic specific, so this imputation tends 
to overestimate the 2009 economic growth in Beijing and therefore an analysis controlling 
for the imputed data should underestimate the fade-away effect in 2009. Our results are 
robust to the addition of the imputed data.  
Other data include the 1999 total energy consumption at the provincial level from the 
China Energy Data Book, and the 1999 total number of motor vehicles by city from the 
China Transportation Yearbook of 2000. Our analysis allows these two variables to affect a 
quadratic  time  trend  of  air  pollution.  We  do  not  use  the  after-2000  data  on  energy 
consumption  and  motor  vehicles  because  a  couple  of  Olympic-motivated  policies  target 
them directly. A dummy of heating season is defined as one if a city has a regular heating 
supply during the winter and if the date under study is between November 15 and March 
15.
15  
   
5.  Main Results 
5.1   Descriptive Analysis 
            Table 2 reports the average daily API by treatment periods and city groups. Before the 
establishment of BOCOG, the average APIs of Beijing and its neighboring cities were 20-50 
points higher than that of control and co-host cities. While the API of every city group improved 
before the end of the Games, neighboring cities did not show improvement in the preparation 
period. In comparison, the improvement in Beijing was not obvious until the start of the Games. 
During the Games, the API of Beijing and its neighbor cities was better than the rest of the 
sample. After the Games, every city group reverted, but not fully to where it was before the setup 
of the BOCOG. Similar patterns appear in the absolute levels of TSP, which was inferred using 
                                                 
15 Roughly speaking, cities to the north of the Huai River have regular heating supply. More detailed city by city 
variation is borrowed from Almond et al. (2009).  November 15 to March 15 is the heating supply dates for Beijing. 
We do not know the exact heating supply dates for other cities with regular heating supply.  15 
 
the reported API.
16.    
Figure 4 shows the detailed API by date and city groups. To facilitate visual comparison, 
every data point plotted in Figure 4 represents a 40-day moving average of API surrounding a 
specific date. Over time, API is trended down for every group. There are  strong seasonal 
variations: high value in winter and low in summer.  This suggests that the better API during the 
summer Games (as shown in Table 2) could be driven by season instead of real improvement and 
a simple before-after comparison of Beijing (as in UNCP 2009) tends to overestimate the air 
quality improvement due to the Olympic Games. Across groups, control and co-host cities show 
similar fluctuations in API. In comparison, Beijing and neighboring cities are more similar to 
each other in terms of variation in API than the control and co-host cities.  
Both Table 2 and Figure 4 indicate significant variations across time, cities, and seasons. 
A pretreatment trend test, after controlling for city fixed effects and day fixed effects, still shows 
significantly different trends across the four city groups, suggesting that more specific controls 
such as city-specific trends might be needed to derive any meaningful inferences on the causal 
impact of the Olympic Games. 
  Table 3 summarizes the average visibility by city groups and treatment periods. In the 
benchmark period, Beijing‟s visibility was slightly better than that of the co-host cities but worse 
than that of control and neighboring cities.  After the setup of BOCOG, Beijing‟s visibility 
improved over time, while all other city groups reported the best visibility during the Games 
(Figure 5). Like API, visibility shows strong seasonal variation: low visibility in winter and high 
in summer. 
Consistent with the literature, we find a significantly negative correlation between 
visibility and API (-0.276, p-value<0.01). Regressing visibility on API and all the other 
meteorological variables by city-day, resulted in an R-square of 0.404; the coefficient of API 
was -0.059 with t-statistics equal to -5.04. The strong correlation between visibility and API 
also indicates toward the fact that 80.12% of city-days in our sample reported TSP as the 
dominant pollutant. 
Table 4 summarizes the average AOD by city groups and treatment periods. Since 
the small fraction of aerosols cycles and recycles longer (Textor, Schulz et al. 2006), policy 
interventions may have a lagged effect on AOD. Therefore, we decompose the post period 
                                                 
16 Inference is available if the API is above 50 and the dominant pollutant is TSP.  16 
 
into 5 spans, namely 1 month, 2-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-10 months and 11-16 months after 
the Games. As shown in Table 4, the AOD of Beijing increased during the Games and the 
most significant drop of AOD appeared in 2-5 months after the Games. By spring 2009, the 
AOD of Beijing bounced back to that of the benchmark period but improved somewhat in 
the rest of 2009. Similar improvement and reversion patterns appear in Figure 7 when we 
plot the satellite based AOD over Beijing for the periods before, during, immediately after 
and  one  year  after  the  Games.  The  plotted  AOD  were  corrected  for  meteorological 
conditions  and  spatiotemporal  trends  in  and  around  Beijing.  Figure  6  shows  strong 
seasonality as well as similarity across the four city groups for AOD. As we expect, AOD is 
positively correlated with API (correlation ~ 0.22) and negatively correlated with visibility 
(~ -0.47).   
 
5.2   Regression Results of API 
Defining the unit of observation as city (c) by date (d), we use the following specification 
to detect the effect of the Olympic Games on API:  
(1)                             ∑                         
                                                                                                
where c  denotes city fixed effects, d   denotes date fixed effects, t denotes the day count 
between 6/5/2000 to d so that c t    captures city-specific time trend. The key variables are the 
interaction of the Beijing dummy and each treatment period. In the most basic form, {       } 
distinguishes preparation from during and post the Games. A more detailed version decomposes 
preparation into 2001-2004 and 2005-2008, and post period into 1, 2-3, 4-6, 7-10 and 11-13 
months post the Games. 
We use several sets of control cities: all the other 36 cities as control; excluding the eight 
co-host and neighbor cities; all the 36 non-Beijing cities but with the co-host and neighbor cities. 
This amounts to:  
   17 
 
(2)                             ∑                         
                        ∑         
 
                      ∑           
 
                               
                                                                 
In both specifications (1) and (2),  cd W  denotes CMA reported weather conditions, 
including rainfall, temperature, barometric pressure, sunshine, humidity (if rainfall is zero), wind 
velocity, and four dummies for wind direction (east, south, west and north) by city and date, cy X  
denotes socioeconomic factors including GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, industrial 
production, and population density by city and year, ,1999 c E  denotes energy use of city c in year 
1999,  ,1999 c V  denotes the number of registered motor vehicles of city c in year 1999, and  cd H  is 
the dummy of heating season. We use 1999 instead of yearly data on energy use and vehicle 
stock because many Olympic preparation efforts might have a direct impact on them. To account 
for their potential growth independent of the Olympic Games, we include the interactions of t
2 
with the 1999 energy use and the 1999 vehicle numbers.
17 The error term, cd  , is clustered by 
each individual city, except that all the co-host cities are pooled as one cluster and all neighbor 
cities are pooled as another cluster. 
Table 5 presents the estimates of , BJ x  ,  , cohost x   and  , neighbor x   in six columns. Columns 1-4 
contrast Beijing with all the other 36 cities. More specifically, Column 1 controls for daily 
weather city fixed effects and date fixed effects, Column 2 adds city-specific linear trends, 
Column 3 adds vehicle and energy controls which include the heating dummy and the interaction 
of t
2 with energy and vehicle numbers as of 1999.  Column 4 adds socioeconomic factors. 
Column 5 uses the same specification as Column 4 but excludes the co-host and neighbor cities 
from the sample. Following specification (2), Column 6 keeps co-host and neighbor cities in the 
sample, but treats them as two separate groups with different coefficients in different periods.  
One consistent finding is that most API improvement in Beijing was recorded during and 
immediately after the Games. Specifically, Column 1 shows that Beijing‟s API was slightly 
better (-0.334, statistically insignificant) in the preparation period than the API before the birth of 
BOCOG (109.31). The effect, measured by decline in API, was the highest during the Games (a 
decline of 29.42 in API) but significantly smaller (13.21) after the Games. Both numbers were 
                                                 
17 The interactions of t*1999 energy use and t*1999 vehicle numbers are absorbed in city specific linear trends.   18 
 
significant with 99% confidence. A similar pattern persisted when we added city-specific linear 
trend, energy and socioeconomic factors or used different sets of control cities. The only 
exception was that, with sufficient controls, the API improvement became statistically significant 
before the Games but its magnitude was still much smaller than during or after the Games.    
Our main assumption is that Beijing was comparable with the control cities without the 
Game related interventions once controlled for the city-by-city differences using the city fixed 
effects, the nationwide fluctuation by date fixed effects, the city-specific linear trend, weather 
and other observable factors. To test this assumption, we perform a pre-treatment test using data 
before the setup of BOCOG. Specifically, we divided the pre-treatment period into two: 
6/5/2000-12/31/2000 and 1/1/2001-12/12/2001. Using the first segment as benchmark, we 
regressed the pre-treatment API on the interaction of Beijing and the dummy of the second 
period, in addition to the same controls as in Columns 1-6. The F-statistics for this interaction 
coefficient, reported at the end of each column, is highly significant in Columns 1-3, but 
insignificant in Columns 4-6. This suggests that it is important to control for the city-specific 
trend, energy and socioeconomic factors before we interpret the estimated , BJ x   as a causal effect 
of the Olympic Games on Beijing.  
In contrast, if we perform the same pretreatment test on co-host and neighbor cites, the F 
statistics are significant, suggesting that co-host and neighbor cities are not readily comparable to 
the 28 control cities and the coefficients reported in Column 6 ( , cohost x   and  , neighbor x  ) cannot be 
interpreted as the causal effect of the Olympic Games. For this reason, we believe Column 5, 
which excludes co-host and neighbor cities from the sample, yields the most robust results.
18  
To further examine how the effect of the Olympic Games has changed over time, we use 
the same specification as in Table 5 Columns 4-5 but decompose the preparation period into two 
sub-periods (prepare1 for 12/13/2001-12/31/2004, prepare2 for 1/1/2005--8/7/2008), and the 
post-Games into five sub-periods (1, 2-3, 4-6, 7-10 and 11-13 months after 9/18/2008).
19 Results 
reported in Table 6 suggest that the API of Beijing‟s API declined slightly in the two preparation 
                                                 
18 In an unreported table, we replaced the dependent variable with ln (API) and found similar results in all five 
columns. 
19 As a robustness check, we have examined the time-varying effects differently by singling out 2007, 2006, 2005, 
2004, and 2003 from the rest of the preparation period progressively. The API results on Beijing and neighbor cities 
are similar to what is reported in the draft. The API results on co-host cities are less stable (some coefficients 
become positive and significant), but they lead to the same conclusion that the Olympic Games do not cause any 
significant API reduction in co-host cities.   19 
 
periods (-5.076 and -2.154), but that improvement was much lower than the reduction of API 
during the Games (32.319). Interestingly, the API improvement declined to 26.494 one month 
immediately after the Games and 12.723 eleven to thirteen months after the Games. The F-tests 
conducted at the end of Table 6 suggest that most of the reversions are statistically significant. In 
short, the biggest effect of the Olympic Games on Beijing API took place during the Games and  
roughly 60% of the effect faded away one year after the Games. 
 
5.3 Results on AOD 
  To address the concern that API may have been subject to manipulated (Andrew 2008), 
we resort to AOD as a more objective measure of air quality. Table 7 reports the regression 
results as we rerun specification (1) on AOD. Since the AOD locations are irregular (because of 
varying satellite path every day), we control for city fixed effects as well as dummies describing 
whether the distance from the center of AOD to the center of the city is less than 12.5km, 
between 12.5km and 25km, and greater than 25km. Since the point-time-specific weather 
conditions (dew point, temperature, wind speed, and relative humidity) were highly auto-
correlated, factor analysis was employed to collapse these variables into three uncorrelated 
factors.  
  Table 7 focuses on the three crude time spans: before, during and after the Games. The 
improvement of AOD (meaning declines) was not statistically significant until after the Games. 
To better understand the timing of AOD improvements, Table 8 decomposed the preparation 
period into prepare1-2 and the post period into after1-5. Like before, we added controls 
progressively from Column 1 to Column 4, excluded co-host and neighboring cities in Column 5, 
and estimated the treatment effects for co-host and neighboring cities separately in Column 6. 
Table 8 only reports the coefficients of Beijing.  
  All six columns present a consistent finding: the improvement of AOD started before the 
Games, sped up during the Games, and reached the best level in 2-6 months after the Games. 
However, by spring 2009, the AOD improvement of Beijing reverted significantly as compared 
to the best level. These estimates are greater than that reported in Table 7 because the estimation 
is somewhat sensitive to how we decompose the preparation period. Different decompositions 
imply different identification on the coefficient of city-specific time trend. We tried a number of 
divisions on the preparation periods. While the point estimates vary, we always reach the same 20 
 
conclusion that AOD improvement was the best 2-6 months after the Games and gradually 
declined afterwards.  
The sharper reversion of API after the Games suggest that the policy interventions 
adopted may have immediate effects on the surface measurement of air quality. However, the 
best improvement in AOD that represents the optical thickness in the atmosphere and influenced 
by meteorological conditions was achieved several weeks after the Games. This suggests that 
cycling and recycling of pollutants, especially fine mode aerosols in the atmosphere may take 
several weeks before the full effects of interventions are realized in the atmosphere and on the 
surface. In the exploratory analysis, we controlled for daily weather conditions up to 10 days 
before the study time. This is the best we can do given the potential colinearity between current 
and lagged weather. Like in Table 8, significant decline of AOD did not occur in Beijing except 
for 2-6 months after the Games.  
  An alternate explanation for the reversion of air quality improvement is economic 
development in 2009. Unfortunately, the National Bureau of Statistics of China has not 
published the city-specific report for 2009. Therefore we cannot control for it directly. In the 
exploratory analysis, we make a linear projection of 2009 socioeconomic factors based on city-
specific data of 2007 and 2008. If anything, this tends to overestimate the economic development 
of Beijing in 2009 because a lot of development in 2008 was driven by one-time investment for 
the Olympic Games. With the imputed 2009 socioeconomic variable, we rerun Tables 5-10 and 
find that the results are very much similar to what is reported here. This robustness suggests that 
the reversion of air quality improvement in Beijing is unlikely driven by the unobserved 
economic development in 2009.
20  
  
6. Gaming of API 
This section examines API more intensively and compares it with visibility, another 
official statistics reported by China but received with much less media attention. If the 
improvement in API was driven by gaming, visibility should not show much improvement. 
  Gaming of blue sky days: One reason that led Andrews (2008) to suspect the API data 
for Beijing was higher frequency in the range right below the cutoff for blue sky days (96-100) 
than in the range right above it (101-105). This pattern could be driven by gaming if Beijing 
                                                 
20 Results are available upon request. 21 
 
officials systematically underreported a slightly-above-100 API than slightly below the 100 
mark. One may argue that such gaming is more likely than blatant cheating either because it is 
easier to manipulate air immediately surrounding the samplers, or because large scale 
underreporting is more likely to raise questions from the central government. However, gaming 
is not the only possibility. Besides measurement error, as argued in Guinot (2008), the density of 
the real API could have decreased between 96 and 105, even without gaming.  
We plot the kernel density of API for each city group (Beijing, co-host, neighbor and 
control) in Figures 8(a) to 8(d). Each figure presents four densities, corresponding to before the 
setup of BOCOG, the preparation period, during the Games, and post the Games. If officials 
underreported API right above the 100 mark as compared to right below the 100 mark, the 
density curve should show a bump right below the 100 mark, and a dip right above the 100 mark. 
In contrast, if API was not subject to gaming, the density plot of API should be as smooth around 
100 as in other neighborhoods.  
An abnormal bump right below 100 does show up in some periods for the co-host, 
neighbor and control cities, but the pattern is less apparent in Beijing because most times the 
mode is close to 100 in Beijing. More importantly, when the mode of Beijing API shifts to the 
left during and after the Games, we do not observe any bump in the area right below the 100 
mark. This is understandable because the goal of Beijing is not limited to the number of “blue 
sky days” and Beijing officials may be reluctant to game the system given the intensive media 
attention on Beijing preceding and succeeding the Games. In comparison, the bump right below 
100 appears in the control cities, despite the lack of connection to the Games. This suggests that, 
if the above-mentioned gaming exists in control cities, they are more likely responsive to the 
nationwide performance evaluation of local officials, rather than to the Games per se. The below-
100 bump for the co-host and neighbor cities could reflect response to both incentives.  
Gaming in the second half of month: To facilitate performance evaluation, local 
governments are required to file monthly report on the number of blue sky days achieved in a 
calendar month. This could generate extra gaming toward the end of month. To evaluate this 
possibility, Figures 9(a) to 9(d) plot the kernel density of API for each city group, for the first- 
and second-half of the month separately. These densities exclude the days during the Olympic 
Games because Olympic-related cities should have incentive to maintain good API throughout 
the duration of the Games, not just in the days towards the end of the month. 22 
 
In Beijing, the API density for the second-half of month does not have a more apparent 
bump right below 100 and the second half of month tends to have even higher API than the first 
half. Both patterns are inconsistent with the extra gaming incentives in the second half of month. 
However, it is more difficult to rule out extra gaming in the second half of month for the other 
three cities groups. The bump below 100 is similar in the first- and second-half of month for the 
control cities, and the bump seems more likely to stand out in the second-half of the month for 
the co-host and neighbor cities.  
  To detect whether the Olympic Games generate more gaming in the second half of a 
month than in the first half, we report two sets of results. The first set focuses on an indicator of 
whether the study date falls into the second half of a month. Since this indicator alone will be 
absorbed with date fixed effects, we interact it with the dummies for the three treatment city 
groups. As reported in Column 1 of Table 9, the coefficients of these interactions are all positive, 
which is against the gaming prediction. In Column 2 of Table 9, we add to Specification (2) a 
full set of interactions between the key variables {             ,                  , and 
                   } and an indicator of whether the study day falls into the second half of a 
month. The coefficients of these new variables capture the additional effect of the Games on the 
second-half of a month, relative to the first half.  If Olympic Games introduced extra incentives 
to gaming around the threshold of 100 in the second half of a month, these new coefficients 
should be significantly negative. As shown in Table 9, one out of the nine coefficients is 
significantly positive, the rest are all indifferent from zero (by 95% confidence). We take this as 
evidence that the Olympic Games do not generate more gaming of the API data in the second 
half of the month than in the first half of month. That being said, it does not rule out the 
possibility that the same amount of gaming may exist in both halves of the month, and some 
gaming around the threshold of blue sky days may have existed nationwide independent of the 
Olympic Games. 
Evidence from visibility: The CMA reported visibility data are not readily available to 
the public (we purchased them from CMA). Since visibility attracts little media attention, there 
should be little incentive to fabricate the visibility data. If the significant API improvement in 
Beijing was due to underreporting of air pollution during the Games (than before and after the 
Games) we should have observed a lower correlation between API and visibility during the 
Games. Throughout our sample, the correlation between API and visibility (by city-day) was  23 
 
-0.2370 before the setup of the BOCOG, -0.2918 in the preparation period, -0.3903 during the 
Games, and -0.2737 after the Games. The higher correlation during the Games is at odds with the 
gaming prediction.  
More importantly, we repeat specification (1) with visibility as the dependent variable. 
Since the co-host and neighboring cities have violated the pretreatment test, Table 10 only 
reports the regression results for Beijing, either pooling the co-host and neighboring cities with 
the control cities (Columns 1-4) or excluding co-host and neighboring cities from the sample 
(Columns 5).The key assumption here is that, before the treatment, the visibility of Beijing 
follows the same fluctuation pattern as that of the control cities, once we control for the daily 
weather, date fixed effects, city fixed effects, city-specific linear trend, energy, and 
socioeconomic factors. To test this assumption, we report the pretreatment test statistics at the 
end of each column. Like API, these statistics suggest that the comparability of Beijing, and 
other cities is not justified until we control for city-specific linear trend, energy, and 
socioeconomic factors.  For this reason, we focus on Columns 4 and 5.  
  The regression results suggest that visibility made some improvement in the preparation 
period and such improvement was highest during the Games. It is tempting to interpret the 
insignificant coefficient of  , BJ x   after the Games as an abatement of visibility improvement, but 
this is not conclusive given the large standard errors. These findings are inconsistent with the 
gaming explanation of API improvements. 
One explanation for the less reversion of visibility is that gaseous pollutants captured in 
API (for example coarse particles) may not have a strong impact on visibility.
21 To examine this 
explanation, we regress API on visibility, take the residual as the non-visibility component of 
API, and use the residuals as the dependent variable for the same specification as Table 10 
Column 6 (i.e. using the most extensive controls but excluding the co-host and neighbor cities 
from the sample). Results suggest that the late-occurring and short-lived effects of the Games on 
Beijing‟s API are likely driven by the non-visibility component of API.  
  Overall, all three datasets – API, visibility and AOD – suggest that Beijing witnessed real 
improvement in air quality due to the Olympic Games. However, both API and AOD data 
suggest that this improvement was short-lived and faded away significantly within one year of 
                                                 
21 Huang et al. (2009) compare visibility with the in situ measure of each pollutant, conditional on data from 
Shanghai only. They show that visibility is more correlated with fine particles (PM2.5) than with other pollutants. 24 
 
the Games.  
 
7.  Mechanisms of air quality improvement in Beijing  
   The above analysis suggests real air quality improvement in Beijing during and after the 
Games. Before policy makers use this finding to guide future policy interventions in China and 
elsewhere,  it is important to understand which actions were most effective in improving air 
quality in Beijing. The preparation period witnessed four types of actions: plant closure, furnace 
renovation, new automobile emission standard, and traffic control. It is difficult to distinguish 
these four actions because they overlap in time and their effects may be cumulative and gradual. 
Given we have developed fine resolution data for Beijing, we present the results of  two 
investigations for Beijing. First, we examine whether the API of Beijing changed significantly 
before and after the cutoff dates corresponding to each action, and assess whether we can 
attribute these changes to a particular action depending on how large the changes were, how 
immediate the effects of the action were, and to what extent the action overlapped with other 
actions. Second, we investigate location specific AOD with respect to location and time of 
interventions. We achieve this by linking the latitudes and longitudes of AOD data with the 
timing and location of plant closures and traffic control for major and secondary roads.
22 This 
approach was subject to the caveat that the effect of surface interventions on AOD may be 
delayed due to the prolonged life cycle of aerosols.  
Evidence from API: Specification (3) mimics Specification (1) but replaces the 
interaction of Beijing and the treatment periods with a set of interactions between Beijing and a 
dummy of whether the study date t is after the above-mentioned cutoff date for action a. For 
example, the dummy of plant closure is defined as one if t is after December 31, 2007 and the 
dummy of traffic control is turned on if t falls into 8/17-8/20/2007 or 7/20/2008-9/20/2008.  
(3)                                                        
                                                                         
                                                                
                                                                                                    . 
To better understand the overlap of the four actions, we first run Specification (3) with 
only one action included and then pool all four actions in the same regression. The results are 
                                                 
22 We cannot find any geographic data on furnaces in Beijing.  25 
 
reported in Table 11. When we look at each action separately, all actions were associated with a 
significant decline in API after the corresponding cutoff date than before the cutoff. However, 
with all four actions combined, only plant closure and traffic control showed significantly 
negative coefficients. The coefficient of furnace renovation was no longer significant, and the 
coefficient of new emission standard was even positive. The counter-intuitive sign for the new 
emission standard is probably because the new standard only applies to new vehicles, which 
could have a perverse effect of encouraging more use of old vehicles. Similarly, no-effect was 
shown in Delhi, India (Kathuria 2002). 
Panels B and C examine how plant closure, traffic control, furnace renovation and new 
emission standard of Beijing correlate with the inferred TSP density and whether the reported 
dominant pollutant is SO2. We dropped NO2 because very few percent of days (0.35%) report 
NO2 as the dominant pollutant. Like Panel A, we first focus on each single action and then pool 
the four actions in the same regression.  
Panel B suggests that plant closure and traffic control accounted for the most reduction in 
the absolute density of TSP. Its similarity with the API results is not surprising because 72.9% of 
the total sample and 84.4% of the Beijing observations reported TSP as the dominant pollutant. 
Since we cannot infer the exact level of TSP when API is below 50 and API is more likely below 
50 during and after the Games, we tend to underestimate the effects of Olympic-related actions 
on TSP. According to the last column of Panel C, only furnace renovation was associated with a 
lower likelihood of SO2 being the dominant pollutant. In theory, plant closure should have had a 
similar effect on SO2 but due to its strong effect on TSP it might have reduced the chance of SO2 
being the dominant pollutant.  Like in Panel A, the introduction of new emission standard has a 
counter intuitive sign on TSP and SO2.   
Evidence from AOD and point-specific policies As described in Section 4, we 
construct variables for permanent plant closure (close_pergd ), temporary plant closure 
(close_temgd ) and road density (road_deng ) for each 2.5km cell, and aggregated them to match 
the spatial resolution of AOD (~ 10km x 10km).  To capture the policy interventions due to the 
Games, the time-invariant road_deng with seven period dummies of  preparation for the Games, 
during the Games, and 1, 2-3, 4-6, 7-10 and 11-15 months after the Games. We expected that the 
effects of the Games be greater in an area with more major and secondary roads. To capture the 
potentially time-varying effect of close_pergd  and close_temgd, we interact close_pergd  with 1, 26 
 
2-3, 4-6, and 7+ months after the closure date and close_temgd with during, 1 month after, 2-3 
months after and 4-6 months after the temporary closure.  
We apply the AOD data of Beijing (at center point p date d) to the following 
specification: 
(4)                     ∑                         
   
     
  ∑                           
    ∑                          
                 
 
   
 
   
 
where    represent area fixed effects for each 10km x 10km square in Beijing.   
  Under this specification, Table 12 reports four sets of results with progressive control of 
date fixed effects, area fixed effects, and weather variables. Across all columns, it is clear that 
traffic control is more effective in improving AOD in the areas with more roads. While this 
improvement started to appear right after the Games, it was the greatest 2-3 months after the 
Games and then tampered off completely within 6 months after the Games. This suggests that the 
strictest traffic control (50% of vehicles off road) was very effective in reducing AOD 
temporarily but the weaker form of traffic control that continued after the Games (vehicles off 
road one of five weekdays) was ineffective. The latter is consistent with evidence shown in 
Mexico City (Davis 2008).   
Similarly, temporary closure had the largest reduction effect on AOD one month after the 
closure and this effect declined afterwards. The effect of permanent closure was not significant 
until 4-6 months after the closure date and dropped quickly afterwards. The lack of permanent 
effects was not surprising, as temporary closure was only effective immediately before and 
during the Games and even if permanent closure had a permanent effect in ground emission, 
nearby aerosols may travel to mitigate the effects. 
The estimates reported in Table 12 allow us to compare the effectiveness of permanent 
plant closure, temporary plant closure and traffic control. The largest coefficient of permanent 
plant closure on AOD improvement suggests that closing one plant permanently will at the best 
improve the AOD within 5km radius by 0.42 units. This is an enormous effect considering the 
fact that the average AOD of Beijing was 0.53 before the setup of the BOCOG. In comparison, 
to achieve the same effect by other measures, one needs to temporarily close 1.6 plants or 
restricting on-road vehicles to half in an AOD area that has a total length of 118.25km in major 
and secondary roads. Given the fact that the road length in a typical 5km radius surrounding a 27 
 
center point of AOD is no more than 12km, plant closure is much more effective than traffic 
control for a specific AOD area. However, traffic control can be applied to many AOD areas at 
the same time but plant closure is tied to a specific address. In this sense, the total effect of traffic 
control can be comparable or even greater than closing a single plant depending on how wide the 
traffic control is applicable. How to compare the effectiveness of these measures in light of their 
economic and social cost is a potential topic for future research.   
Overall, the detailed analysis of AOD within Beijing confirms the previous finding that 
traffic control and plant closure were most likely to be responsible for the air quality 
improvement in Beijing and their effects were temporary.  
   
8. Conclusion 
Viewing the 2008 Olympic Games as a political opportunity, China adopted a series of 
radical measures to improve air quality in Beijing. Based on the publicly reported air pollution 
index (API), we find that these actions, especially plant closure and traffic control, effectively 
reduced the API (i.e. improvement in air quality) in Beijing by 29.65% during the Games as 
compared to one year before any Olympic-motivated action.
23 However, roughly 60% of this 
improvement in air quality dissipated one year after the Games.
24 The satellite based AOD data, 
acquired from NASA, confirms that air quality improvement in Beijing was real but temporary.  
Our results imply that, in contrast to the common wisdom regarding the impact of 
political regime on environmental protection (Oates and Portney 2003), an authoritarian regime 
could use its administrative power to improve air (or environmental) quality but its effectiveness 
may largely depend on the underlying political motivation. Even if the regime has such 
motivation, it remains an open question as to whether the actions adopted by an authoritarian 
regime are in line with the public health and/or environmental interest in the long run. Is it 
possible that China has sacrificed other welfare-enhancing policies in order to boost its political 
image during the Games? Could it be more beneficial to the society if the same resources were 
distributed more evenly across geographic space and time? These questions, as well as the 
impact of the air quality improvement on human health and environment, call for future research.  
                                                 
23 The estimated improvement is 32.23, which is a 29.65% reduction from the absolute level of API in Beijing 
before the setup of BOCOG (109.01).   
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Figure 1: The map of the 37 study cities 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Permanent and Temporary Plant Closures in Beijing 
 
Data source: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-04/14/content_944313.htm  32 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of major and secondary roads in Beijing, as of 2005 








Figure 5: Time series of visibility by city group and treatment periods
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Figure 6: Time series of satellite-based AOD by city group and treatment periods
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Figure 8: Kernel density of API by city group and period 





Figure 9: Kernel density of API by city group and half month 
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Table 1: MEP cutoff points for different levels of API 
 
API  Pollutant intensity (μg/m





Notes of health effects 
TSP  SO2  NO2 
500  1000  2620  940  V  Heavy 
pollution 
Exercise endurance of the healthy people 
drops down, some will have strong 
symptoms. Some diseases will appear. 
400  875  2100  750 
300  625  1600  565  IV  Moderate 
pollution 
The symptoms of the patients with cardiac 
and lung diseases will be aggravated 
remarkably. Healthy people will 
experience a drop in endurance and 
increased symptoms. 
200  500  250  150  III  Slightly 
polluted 
The symptom of the susceptible is slightly 
aggravated, while the healthy people will 
have stimulated symptoms. 
100  300  150  100  II  Good  Daily activity will not be affected. 
50  120  50  50  I  Excellent  Daily activity will not be affected. 
Source: The first four columns are taken from the MEP website. The last three columns are copied from 
Table 2.2 of UNEP (2009).  
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Table 2: Summary of daily average API by treatment periods and city groups 
 
API  Control 




Benchmark period (06/05/00-12/12/01)  76.08  109.01  88.16  126.79 
Preparation (12/13/01-08/07/08)  72.36  102.93  78.79  93.11 
  Preparation 1 (12/13/01-12/31/04)  74.91  104.02  82.82  102.90 
  Preparation 2 (01/01/05-08/07/08)  70.18   102.01  75.36  84.81 
Olympic Games (08/08/08-09/17/08)  56.16  54.88  57.34  52.47 
After Games (09/18/08-12/31/09)  65.55  81.83  70.78  73.11 
   After Games 1 (09/18/08-10/17/08)  63.58  66.63  65.93  62.16 
   After Games 2 (10/18/08-12/17/08)  73.12  89.36  76.08  86.09 
   After Games 3 (12/18/08-03/17/09)  74.13  85.07  79.60  86.99 
   After Games 4 (03/18/09-07/17/09)  61.82  81.35  67.18  70.26 
   After Games 5 (07/18/09-10/31/09)  58.82  79.62  65.84  60.35 




3) inferred from API 
(conditional on API>=50 & dominant 
pollutant=TSP) 
Control 




Benchmark period (06/05/00-12/12/01)  235.57  311.47  256.63  345.97 
Preparation (12/13/01-08/07/08)  226.70  301.21  232.71  274.34 
  Preparation 1 (12/13/01-12/31/04)  234.70  305.09  243.98  294.28 
  Preparation 2 (01/01/05-08/07/08)  219.68  298.08  222.34  256.20 
Olympic Games (08/08/08-09/17/08)  179.44  178.78  182.48  161.08 
After Games (09/18/08-12/31/09)  211.04  249.81  211.99  217.60 
   After Games 1 (09/18/08-10/17/08)  201.99  226.84  202.36  209.93 
   After Games 2 (10/18/08-12/17/08)  227.41  269.48  230.84  253.31 
   After Games 3 (12/18/08-03/17/09)  234.69  266.64  238.87  244.62 
   After Games 4 (03/18/09-07/17/09)  202.04  240.30  200.11  215.95 
   After Games 5 (07/18/09-10/31/09)  192.61  243.11  202.45  187.71 
Total  225.82  295.72  233.66  279.87 
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Table 3: Summary of visibility by treatment periods and city groups 
 
Visibility (km)  Control 




Benchmark period (06/05/00-12/12/01)  17.85  15.77  15.15  16.35 
Preparation (12/13/01-08/07/08)  16.58  18.06  14.28  15.37 
  Preparation 1 (12/13/01-12/31/04)  16.83  17.44  14.42  15.74 
  Preparation 2 (01/01/05-08/07/08)  16.37  18.59  14.16  15.05 
Olympic Games (08/08/08-9/17/08)  19.03  20.71  16.17  15.99 
After Games (09/18/08-12/31/09)  17.33  21.24  15.78  16.78 
   After Games 1 (09/18/08-10/17/08)  17.24  19.80  17.43  14.47 
   After Games 2 (10/18/08-12/17/08)  16.69  19.33  16.07  17.48 
   After Games 3 (12/18/08-03/17/09)  14.74  21.38  14.58  14.37 
   After Games 4 (03/18/09-07/17/09)  18.50  23.70  15.41  18.91 
   After Games 5 (07/18/09-10/31/09)  18.55  19.77  16.57  16.62 





Table 4: Summary of AOD by treatment periods and city groups 
 
AOD  Control 




Benchmark period (02/25/00-12/12/01)  0.55  0.53  0.52  0.48 
Preparation (12/13/01-08/07/08)  0.62  0.61  0.62  0.53 
  Preparation 1 (12/13/01-12/31/04)  0.59  0.59  0.57  0.50 
  Preparation 2 (01/01/05-08/07/08)  0.64  0.63  0.65  0.55 
Olympic Games (08/08/08-9/17/08)  0.57  0.56  0.55  0.45 
After Games (09/18/08-12/31/09)  0.53  0.44  0.46  0.35 
   After Games 1 (09/18/08-10/17/08)  0.59  0.54  0.50  0.42 
   After Games 2 (10/18/08-12/17/08)  0.42  0.26  0.31  0.21 
   After Games 3 (12/18/08-03/17/09)  0.50  0.27  0.39  0.30 
   After Games 4 (03/18/09-07/17/09)  0.72  0.63  0.65  0.51 
   After Games 5 (07/18/09-12/31/09)  0.49  0.45  0.47  0.33 
Total  0.60  0.58  0.59  0.50 
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Table 5: Main results on API 
 
  (1)  (2)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  API  API  API  API  API  API 
BJ×Preparation  -0.334  -2.928  -4.922*  -5.085**  -6.353**  -5.455** 
  (2.193)  (1.842)  (2.640)  (2.467)  (2.578)  (2.535) 
BJ×During  -29.423***  -34.820***  -34.335***  -34.905***  -37.642***  -36.888*** 
  (3.611)  (2.346)  (2.260)  (2.428)  (2.813)  (2.397) 
BJ×After  -13.208***  -19.173***  -19.643***  -22.035***  -23.580***  -22.593*** 
  (2.632)  (1.857)  (1.780)  (3.399)  (3.995)  (3.589) 
Co-host×            -1.087 
Preparation            (1.514) 
Co-host×            -1.973 
During            (2.054) 
Co-host×After            3.842* 
Games            (1.930) 
Neighbor×            -15.701*** 
Preparation            (2.340) 
Neighbor×            -20.677*** 
During            (2.904) 
Neighbor× After             -7.838** 
Games            (3.042) 
Weather  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Date FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City-specific 
linear trends 
  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Energy&Vehicle
*date^2 
    Y  Y  Y  Y 
Heating      Y  Y  Y  Y 
Socioeconomic 
factors 
      Y  Y  Y 
Co-host and 
neighbor cities 
included  included  included  included  excluded  included 
Observations  126688  126688  126688  126688  99584  126688 
R-squared  0.416  0.433  0.439  0.439  0.430  0.440 
Pretreatment test 















for co-host and 
neighbor cities 
(p-value) 




Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Socioeconomic factors include 
GDP growth rate, average GDP, industrial production and population density by city and year. Weather 
includes rainfall, temperature, barometric pressure, sunshine, humidity if rainfall is zero, wind velocity, four 
dummies for wind direction (east, south, west and north) by city and date. 
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Table 6: Time varying effects of the Olympic Games on API 
  after1 is the first month after Olympics 
  after2 is 2-3 months after the Olympics 
  after3 is 4-6 months after the Olympics 
  after4 is 7-10 months after the Olympics 
  after5 is the rest. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  API  API  API  API 
BJ×Prepare  -5.085**    -6.353**   
  (2.467)    (2.578)   
BJ×Prepare1    -3.572    -5.076** 
    (2.316)    (2.446) 
BJ×Prepare2    0.073    -2.154 
    (2.573)    (2.972) 
BJ×During Games  -34.905***  -28.462***  -37.642***  -32.319*** 
  (2.428)  (2.872)  (2.813)  (2.720) 
BJ×After  -22.035***    -23.580***   
  (3.399)    (3.995)   
BJ×After1    -22.965***    -26.494*** 
    (2.983)    (2.737) 
BJ×After2    -15.382***    -18.497*** 
    (3.058)    (4.475) 
BJ×After3    -22.997***    -26.444** 
    (6.676)    (9.846) 
BJ×After4    -10.423**    -12.329** 
    (5.071)    (5.600) 
BJ×After5    -10.252*    -12.723** 
    (5.502)    (5.953) 
Weather  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Date FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City-specific linear trends  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Energy&Vehicle*date^2  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Heating  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Socioeconomic factors  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Co-host and neighbor 
cities 
included  included  Excluded  Excluded 
Observations  126688  126688  99584  99584 
R-squared  0.439  0.439  0.430  0.430 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Socioeconomic factors include GDP 
growth rate, average GDP, industrial production and population density by city and year. Weather includes rainfall, 
temperature, barometric pressure, sunshine, humidity if rainfall is zero, wind velocity, four dummies for wind 
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Table 6-continued: F test for the decreasing effect 
 
  Cells marked yellow imply that the effect in the latter period (column) is significantly smaller than the effect in 
the former (row) period. 
  Cells marked green imply that the effect in the latter period (column) is significantly larger than the effect in the 
former (row) period. 
 
F test for column 2 of table 6: test whether the effect is decreasing 
F-stat (p-
value) 
BJ×After1  BJ×After2  BJ×After3  BJ×After4  BJ×After5 




























BJ×After4          0.01 
(0.9214) 
 
F test for column 4 of table 6: test whether the effect is decreasing 
F-stat (p-
value) 
BJ×After1  BJ×After2  BJ×After3  BJ×After4  BJ×After5 
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Table 7: Main results on AOD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000 
Beijing_prepare  15.309  -27.909**  -27.405  -35.567  -31.456  -44.025* 
  (10.395)  (11.204)  (20.910)  (22.319)  (27.206)  (24.308) 
Beijing_during  41.065**  -37.943  -39.418  -45.037  -38.270  -55.132 
  (19.713)  (27.908)  (28.474)  (28.946)  (37.173)  (33.974) 
Beijing_after  -22.236  -99.916***  -96.803***  -125.392***  -130.247***  -163.467*** 
  (16.763)  (30.641)  (30.420)  (31.304)  (37.851)  (35.335) 
Co-host_prepare            -13.867 
            (16.706) 
Co-host_during            -49.676 
            (47.491) 
Co-host_after            -70.148 
            (55.799) 
Neighbor_prepare            -37.613** 
            (17.045) 
Neighbor_during            -11.749 
            (27.824) 
Neighbor_after            -82.243* 
            (43.240) 
Weather  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Date FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City_specific linear trend    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Energy&Vehicle*date^2      Y  Y  Y  Y 
Heating      Y  Y  Y  Y 
Socioeconomic factors        Y  Y  Y 
Co-host and neighbor cities  included  included  included  included  excluded  included 
Observations  2614734  2614734  2614734  2614734  1892832  2614734 
R-squared  0.422  0.424  0.425  0.425  0.444  0.425 














Pretreatment  test  for  Co-
host and Neighbor cities  F-
stat (p-value) 
          8.23  
(0.0011) 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dummies for three distance categories 
are controlled for in all columns. Weather of point p in city c at date d and time t includes three factors: tr_fac1, 
tr_fac2 and tr_fac3. Energy includes 1999 energy*date quadratic, 1999 vehicle*date quadratic, heating*dummy of 
Nov 15-Mar 15. Socioeconomic factors include GDP growth rate, average GDP, industrial production and population 
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Table 8: Time-varying results on AOD 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000  AOD*1000 
Beijing_prepare1  4.989  -38.608***  -40.850*  -51.349**  -53.292*  -60.503** 
  (8.671)  (10.887)  (20.638)  (23.879)  (29.644)  (25.954) 
Beijing_prepare2  22.776  -72.386***  -74.200**  -90.637***  -108.690**  -102.836*** 
  (13.711)  (17.069)  (27.482)  (32.890)  (40.704)  (36.593) 
Beijing_during  41.173**  -89.594***  -92.019***  -109.326***  -128.030***  -124.411*** 
  (19.764)  (28.283)  (30.901)  (35.304)  (41.445)  (40.267) 
Beijing_after1  -51.921**  -176.215***  -180.495***  -198.082***  -226.313***  -243.896*** 
  (23.875)  (36.645)  (38.431)  (42.056)  (55.393)  (46.113) 
Beijing_after2  -57.941**  -186.188***  -178.617***  -196.663***  -255.381***  -241.003*** 
  (24.272)  (38.736)  (40.113)  (42.905)  (47.763)  (42.163) 
Beijing_after3  -68.475***  -196.045***  -179.386***  -225.735***  -240.056***  -263.987*** 
  (21.986)  (32.596)  (34.771)  (45.843)  (57.076)  (50.921) 
Beijing_after4  17.415  -119.584***  -121.364***  -181.546***  -183.402***  -238.637*** 
  (18.555)  (29.430)  (29.226)  (54.645)  (62.567)  (60.759) 
Beijing_after5  28.634  -115.711***  -113.751***  -174.321***  -175.329***  -204.781*** 
  (17.871)  (32.906)  (32.904)  (50.565)  (61.413)  (57.103) 
Weather  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Date FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City_specific linear trend    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Energy      Y  Y  Y  Y 
Socioeconomic factors        Y  Y  Y 
Co-host and neighbor cities  included  included  included  included  excluded  included 
Observations  2614734  2614734  2614734  2614734  1892832  2614734 
R-squared  0.422  0.424  0.425  0.425  0.444  0.425 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dummies for three distance categories 
are controlled for in all columns. Weather of point p in city c at date d and time t includes three factors: tr_fac1, 
tr_fac2 and tr_fac3. Energy includes 1999 energy*date quadratic, 1999 vehicle*date quadratic, heating*dummy of 
Nov 15-Mar 15. Socioeconomic factors include GDP growth rate, average GDP, industrial production and population 
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Table 8-continued: F test for after-Olympic periods 
 
  Cells marked yellow imply that the effect in the latter (column) period is significantly smaller than the 
effect in the former (row) period. 
  Cells marked green imply that the effect in the latter (column) period is significantly larger than the effect 
in the former (row) period. 
 
F test for column 4 of table 10: test whether the effect is decreasing 
F-stat (p-
value) 
BJ×After1  BJ×After2  BJ×After3  BJ×After4  BJ×After5 




























BJ×After4          0.16 
(0.6923) 
 
F test for column 4 of table 6: test whether the effect is decreasing 
F-stat (p-
value) 
BJ×After1  BJ×After2  BJ×After3  BJ×After4  BJ×After5 














































     47 
Table 9: API results by first and second half of a month 
 
Dependent variable = API, Observation = 126688 
  (1)  (2) 
BJ x second half month  1.767***  -0.859 
  (0.233)  (1.091) 
BJ×preparation    -7.237** 
    (2.837) 
BJ×preparation x second half month    3.751*** 
    (1.265) 
BJ×during Games    -36.960*** 
    (2.442) 
BJ×after Games    -22.281*** 
    (3.553) 
BJ×after Games x second half month    -0.594 
    (1.613) 
Co-host x second half month  0.541**  1.698* 
  (0.237)  (0.953) 
Co-host×preparation    -0.520 
    (1.832) 
Co-host×preparation x second half month    -1.230 
    (1.095) 
Co-host×during Games    -1.844 
    (2.093) 
Co-host×after Games    4.974** 
    (2.262) 
Co-host×after Games x second half month    -2.397 
    (1.477) 
Neighbor x second half month  0.541**  -0.946 
  (0.241)  (1.065) 
Neighbor ×preparation    -16.595*** 
    (2.322) 
Neighbor ×preparation x second half month    1.894 
    (1.187) 
Neighbor ×during Games    -20.749*** 
    (2.911) 
Neighbor ×after Games    -8.293*** 
    (2.889) 
Neighbor ×after Games x second half month    0.974 
    (1.515) 
Observations  126688  126688 
R2  0.44  0.44 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All the coefficients are obtained 
in one regression with city fixed effects, day fixed effects, city-specific linear trend, energy, socioeconomic 
factors,  and  weather.  Energy  includes  1999  energy*  date  quadratic,  1999  vehicle*date  quadratic, 
heating*dummy of Nov 15-Mar 15. Socioeconomic factors include GDP growth rate, average GDP, industrial 
production  and  population  density  by  city  and  year.  Weather  includes  rainfall,  temperature,  barometric 
pressure, sunshine, humidity, wind velocity, four dummies for wind direction (east, south, west and north) by 
city and date. 
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Table 10: Regression results on visibility 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Visibility  Visibility  Visibility  Visibility  Visibility  API residual 
BJ×Preparation  3.195***  1.359***  0.867**  0.721  0.934*  -5.234** 
  (0.217)  (0.207)  (0.406)  (0.431)  (0.495)  (2.544) 
BJ×During   4.477***  1.120***  1.058***  0.933**  0.994**  -36.451*** 
  (0.429)  (0.337)  (0.367)  (0.374)  (0.466)  (2.857) 
BJ×After   4.522***  0.869**  0.806**  0.721  0.933  -22.463*** 
  (0.390)  (0.348)  (0.344)  (0.656)  (0.773)  (3.795) 
Weather  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Date FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City-specific 
linear trends 
  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Energy&Vehicle
*date^2 
    Y  Y  Y  Y 
Heating      Y  Y  Y  Y 
Socioeconomic 
factors 
      Y  Y  Y 
Co-host  and 
neighbor cities 
included  included  included  included  excluded  excluded 
Observations  126688  126688  126688  126688  99584  99584 
R-squared  0.569  0.573  0.574  0.575  0.587  0.418 
Pretreatment  test 














Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Socioeconomic factors include 
GDP growth rate, average GDP, industrial production and population density by city and year. Weather 
includes rainfall, temperature, barometric pressure, sunshine, humidity if rainfall is zero, wind velocity, four 
dummies for wind direction (east, south, west and north) by city and date. 
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Table 11: Mechanism detection using API data 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Panel A: Dependent  Variable = API 
BJ×Plant Closure  -13.886***        -32.940*** 
  (3.878)        (3.772) 
BJ×Furnace Rennovation    -6.918**      -1.645 
    (3.331)      (2.462) 
BJ×New Emission      -7.521*    24.170*** 
      (3.782)    (3.910) 
BJ×Traffic Control        -17.341***  -14.527*** 
        (3.196)  (3.885) 
Observations  99584  99584  99584  99584  99584 
R2  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43 
Panel  B:  Dependent  Variable  =  Inferred  TSP  in  μg/m
3  (conditional  on  API>=50  &  dominant 
pollutant=TSP)
 
BJ×Plant Closure  -27.740***        -77.646*** 
  (9.621)        (7.533) 
BJ×Furnace Rennovation    -13.623      -4.381 
    (8.562)      (6.757) 
BJ×New Emission      -14.429    60.397*** 
      (9.711)    (9.338) 
BJ×Traffic Control        -32.899***  -27.624*** 
        (7.721)  (8.739) 
Observations  71173  71173  71173  71173  71173 
R2  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42 
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Dummy of SO2 being the dominant pollutant 
BJ×Plant Closure  0.066**        -0.033 
  (0.024)        (0.042) 
BJ×Furnace Rennovation    -0.019      -0.044* 
    (0.025)      (0.023) 
BJ×New Emission      0.089***    0.129** 
      (0.027)    (0.050) 
BJ×Traffic Control        0.046**  0.007 
        (0.020)  (0.019) 
Observations  99584  99584  99584  99584  99584 
R2  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21 
City FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Date FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City-specific linear trends  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Weather  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Energy & Vehicle*t^2  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Socioeconomic factors  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Co-host and neighbor cities  excluded  excluded  excluded  excluded  excluded 
Note:  Clustered  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***p<0.01,  **p<0.05,  *p<0.1.  Weather  includes  rainfall, 
temperature, barometric pressure, sunshine, humidity, wind velocity, four dummies for wind direction (east, 
south, west and north) by city and date. 
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Table 12: Mechanism detection using AOD data and location-specific policies  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  AOD*10^6  AOD*10^6  AOD*10^6  AOD*10^6 
Road length*         
Preparation for Games  -0.123*  -0.097***  0.090***  0.085*** 
  (0.066)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
During the Games  -0.484***  -0.340***  -0.020  -0.037 
  (0.111)  (0.075)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
1 month after Games  -0.835***  -0.589***  -0.248***  -0.265*** 
  (0.114)  (0.054)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
2-3 months after Games  -0.967***  -0.834***  -0.347***  -0.354*** 
  (0.090)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
4-6 months after Games  -1.179***  -1.109***  -0.335***  -0.299*** 
  (0.133)  (0.085)  (0.074)  (0.070) 
7-10 months after Games  -0.302***  -0.076  0.085**  0.082** 
  (0.105)  (0.048)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
11-15 months after Games  -0.524***  -0.407***  -0.147***  -0.146*** 
  (0.125)  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Permanent closure*         
1 month after closure  370832.547  298758.406**  138565.670  137525.013 
  (318199.715)  (132060.006)  (125869.322)  (124835.985) 
2-3 months after closure  78030.001  147721.110***  21077.080  19783.409 
  (78360.028)  (44625.879)  (44526.709)  (44943.191) 
4-6 months after closure  -183015.200***  -12341.830  -41435.026*  -41859.605** 
  (51085.653)  (28451.278)  (21553.660)  (21242.877) 
7+ months after closure  84565.870***  63411.523***  -18219.266*  -16803.589* 
  (29437.937)  (14766.186)  (9746.093)  (9737.749) 
Temporary closure *         
During closure  -81231.537**  9499.631  17981.410  18566.090 
  (34284.373)  (16587.897)  (14662.832)  (14744.359) 
1 month after closure  -75328.125**  -27882.007**  -25173.525**  -25978.657** 
  (33585.856)  (13764.728)  (11877.424)  (12190.489) 
2-3 months after closure  -77613.787***  -34092.672***  -13638.940*  -13266.406* 
  (13316.433)  (7155.813)  (7825.291)  (7801.435) 
4-6 months after closure  -64615.638***  -26413.263**  -21949.223**  -20069.643** 
  (18004.374)  (10749.104)  (8570.402)  (8461.783) 
Date FE    Y  Y  Y 
10kmx10m area FE      Y  Y 
Weather        Y 
Observations  102820  102820  102820  102820 
R-squared  0.100  0.839  0.885  0.886 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors (by 10kmx10km area) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Linear date count is controlled for in the first column. Weather of point p at date d 
includes three independent factors derived from the raw data on temperature, humidity, etc. 
 
 
 